Although the cooperation between the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the FDLR is widely known, it should be a source of shame that President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy would travel to eight African and European countries within a single month solely to deliver messages on behalf of the terrorist group.
Between July 13 and 26, 2026, Floribert Anzuluni, the DRC’s Minister in charge of Regional Integration and President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy, traveled to eight countries, holding meetings with heads of state and government officials in Togo, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Belgium, France, South Africa, and Equatorial Guinea.
Several of these countries said he had arrived carrying confidential messages from Tshisekedi for their leaders. Jeune Afrique reported that during his visits, Anzuluni showed them a letter signed by FDLR leader Victor Byiringiro, outlining the group’s position on how the process of dismantling the FDLR should be carried out.
In other words, the FDLR president reportedly wrote directly to Tshisekedi, who then gave the letter to his special envoy to deliver to the leaders of the countries he visited. Many of these countries have significant influence within international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the European Union (EU), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
As if that were not enough, a press conference was organized to justify the mission. On July 28, 2026, Floribert Anzuluni and Patrick Muyaya, a spokesperson for the Tshisekedi administration, told journalists that the FDLR letter demonstrated that the DRC was committed to implementing the agreements signed in Washington on December 4, 2025.
However, those agreements are based on the DRC’s dismantling of the FDLR, which would then be followed by a reduction in Rwanda’s defensive measures.
Nowhere do the agreements provide for the FDLR to be consulted on how the process should proceed, because the group is not considered one of the parties to the agreements. Instead, the FDLR is among the elements that the agreements seek to eliminate in order to achieve peace.
What is surprising is that even the countries that received him did not point out that such conduct was disgraceful and should not characterize the actions of a legitimate government. Perhaps they believe that the DRC may be bringing disgrace upon itself.
The FDLR was founded by soldiers and Interahamwe members who played a role in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The group has been sanctioned by the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union.
Showing the international community that Tshisekedi communicates directly with FDLR leaders, to the extent of sending his special envoy to speak on behalf of the group at a time when the DRC was expected to dismantle it within 90 days of the peace agreement, suggests that Tshisekedi remains comfortable with acting as a protector of the FDLR.
The 2026 report by the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC stated that Congolese military and government officials had assured the FDLR that they would do everything possible to protect the group and that it should not be intimidated by the Washington agreement aimed at dismantling it.
Following the publication of that report in June, reports emerged that some FDLR fighters were gradually being integrated into various Wazalendo groups, allegedly in an effort to conceal the actual number and locations of FDLR fighters.
Muyaya and Anzuluni told journalists that of the six main areas where the FDLR has established positions, the DRC controls only one, in Walikale, while the other five are located in areas controlled by the AFC/M23 movement.
This is an issue the Tshisekedi administration repeatedly raises whenever it is questioned about why it has failed to dismantle the FDLR as agreed. At times, officials even claim that the FDLR does not exist and is merely an excuse invented by Rwanda. At other times, they argue that the group consists of aging fighters who are incapable of threatening Rwanda’s security. What they say today is not necessarily what they repeat tomorrow.
One thing is clear: Tshisekedi wants to portray himself as a leader seeking to bring peace to the DRC, while at the same time maintaining ties with the FDLR, which he has reportedly provided with weapons and financial support, while the group has been fighting against the AFC/M23 in his interest, as members of the national army (FARDC) have either fled or refused to fight after reportedly going unpaid.
There is no dispute that Tshisekedi leads a country facing a multitude of challenges. But in the eight years he has been in power, has he managed to solve even one of them? No.
Allowing these problems to persist—or become even worse—appears to be the only thing that could enable him to retain the position and prestige he enjoys today.
With two years remaining before the end of his second and final term permitted under the Constitution, Tshisekedi is under pressure from opponents who have united under what is known as the “Article 64 Coalition” (C64). They have vowed not to give him any respite as long as he continues with the initiative he has launched to amend the Constitution in an effort to remain in power.
Following the June 12, 2026 demonstrations, during which Martin Fayulu and Delly Sesanga were shot and seriously injured, Tshisekedi asked religious leaders to appeal to the leaders of the C64 coalition to call off a nationwide and diaspora-wide protest that had been scheduled for July 22, 2026, so that inclusive dialogue could take place first.
The C64 coalition accepted the request and postponed the protests, but gave Tshisekedi a deadline of August 15, 2026. It warned that if he failed to hold the proposed talks and clarify what action he intended to take regarding their demand to halt the constitutional amendment project, the protests would resume without fail.
As he has done before—appearing to seek dialogue in order to buy time whenever political pressure becomes intense—Tshisekedi continues to engage with the C64 coalition while his constitutional amendment project moves forward.
On July 28, 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that the proposal to hold a referendum on amending the Constitution was not unconstitutional. This was the remaining step after lawmakers in both the National Assembly and Senate approved the referendum. The referendum is widely viewed as the only remaining bridge that could enable Tshisekedi to remain in power for as long as he wishes.
Although Tshisekedi came to power in January 2019 promising that his first priority would be to pursue peace in eastern DRC, the worsening insecurity in the region has instead become the justification he is using to push for constitutional reform and seek a third term.
For the eight years that Tshisekedi has been in power, he has continued to give different excuses for failing to fulfill the promises he made to those who voted for him in 2018, when Fayulu was reportedly the actual winner but his votes were allegedly stolen. Analysts say this period should be enough for the Congolese people to realize that he cannot deliver meaningful change for them.
His thirst for power and his support for the FDLR’s ideology of hatred toward the Tutsi are what occupy his thoughts day and night.
